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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate, in an Egyptian context, the external auditor type
(Big 4 vs local) implications on reporting quality proxied by discretionary accruals (DA) and also examine
whether auditor type impacts the market’s pricing of DA, where pricing is considered a proxy for the
perceived DA quality.
Design/methodology/approach – The sample period is 2012–2015, that is meant to be post the Egyptian
revolution financial crisis; all Egyptian stock exchange (EGX) listed firms (except banks and financial
institutions) are considered. DA are estimated using modified Dichev and Dechow’s (2002) model
(McNicholas, 2002). Ordinary least squares regression tests are used to investigate the external auditor type
implications on DA level and the related EGX investors’ pricing.
Findings – The findings generally show the external auditor’s minimal role in mitigating DA. Moreover, the
findings reflect the EGX investors’ negligence and/or lack of confidence in regards to DA and external auditor
type factors in stock pricing.
Practical implications – The paper findings highlight to regulators the need for effective monitoring of
audit firms earnings management mitigation performance to help reinforce investor confidence in financial
reporting quality.
Originality/value – This paper is the first that investigates the external auditor monitoring mechanism
implications on investors’ perceptions of earnings quality in Egypt. The paper findings would provide
important contributions, particularly post the Egyptian revolution crisis, where the EGX market is trying to
restore the investors’ confidence.
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1. Introduction
Over the last two decades, the corporate failings (including Enron, Tyco and WorldCom)
have interrogated the public trust in the auditing profession and resulted in increased
regulatory scrutiny. For instance, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) inaction in 2002, to call for
reinforced auditor independence and the formation of Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB) to monitor the external audit services quality (Lamoreaux, 2016).
The audit market dramatic changes have increased the audit requirements demands
(e.g. internal controls systems effectiveness assessment) that resulted in shifting from Big 4
audit firms to local audit firms mainly due to enlarged audit fees (Blokdijk et al., 2006;
Rama and Read, 2006; Lawrence et al., 2011; Cassell et al., 2013; Comprix and Huang, 2015).
Especially after 2002, local auditors are progressively exposed to higher business risk due to
their acceptance of bigger size clients approaching from predecessor Big 4 auditors (Hogan
and Martin, 2009). However, clients could be hesitant to engage local audit firms because of
the apparent variances in name recognition or reputation, practical competences
and industry know-how. Market participants’ prospects or assurance requests
(e.g. shareholders, creditors, etc.) could be of major significance in their unwillingness to
consider local audit firms (Cullinan et al., 2012).
Commonly, literature studies have documented the relative high quality of Big 4 audit
firms’ services (e.g. Boone et al., 2009; Samaha and Hegazy, 2010; Rutledge et al., 2014;
Comprix and Huang, 2015). However, PCAOB suggested no audit quality differences
between Big 4 and local audit firms. The US market research supported the PCAOB’s

argument, for example, Lawrence et al. (2011) found that controlling for client’s size
diminished the differences in audit quality between Big 4 and local audit firms. Jenkins and
Velury (2011) found non-significant difference in conservatism between clients of Big 4 and
local auditors in either the pre- or post-SOX periods. Moreover, Boone et al. (2010) did not
evidence a significant difference in the performance-adjusted abnormal accruals between
the clients of Big 4 and local audit firms. Also, Cassell et al. (2013) showed that the financial
reporting credibility of local firms audited clients was indistinguishable from Big 4-audited
counterparts. Consistently, Geiger and Rama (2006) documented no discretionary accruals
(DA) significant differences between clients of Big 4 and local audit firms.
Investigating the stakeholders’ perceptions, Gray and Ratzinger (2010) reported that vs
Big 4 firms, stakeholders generally agreed that local firms provided comparable audit
quality. Moreover, post the SOX, Kao et al. (2013) investigated whether local auditors have
enhanced their ability to resist client pressure over accrual reporting. Regressing abnormal
accruals on proxies for economic bonding, they found that changes in the association,
defined as (post–pre), were significantly negative, implying local audit firms’ independence
improvement. Also, Lai (2013) found that Ex-Andersen clients of non-Big 4 auditors had a
higher likelihood of going-concern opinions and lower levels of DA.
On the other hand, very minor research literature focused on the Big 4 audit quality
against local firms in developing markets. For example, Muttakin et al. (2017) investigated
the moderating role of audit quality on the association between business group affiliation of
firms and earnings management in the South Asian emerging economy of Bangladesh.
Results showed that the level of DA was positively associated with business group
affiliation status, and higher audit quality reduced this association. However, Muttakin et al.
(2017) did not consider the audit firm type in their analysis. Mo et al. (2015) examined a
sample of Chinese financially-distressed companies from 2001 to 2010, and revealed that the
Chinese affiliates of Big 4 auditors had a higher propensity to issue going concern
reports than local auditors not only in the post-bankruptcy law period, but also in the
pre-bankruptcy law period. Also, Wang et al. (2009) found that the Chinese audit market
expansion did not provide the local auditors any price advantage. They argued that this
may be a strategy to win future clients that seek low-priced audits. In Serbia, Stanisic et al.
(2015) tried to define the so-called “second tier” auditor by investigating the listed firms’
financial statements. However, exploring the quality of these second tier audit firms was not
considered in the analysis. However, Rusmin et al. (2014) indicated across Indonesia,
Malaysia and Singapore that audit quality had negative relationships with earnings
management measure (DA). The result of univariate analysis suggested that mean of DA in
companies audited by Big 4 auditors were significantly smaller compared to that of in
non-Big 4-audited firms. However, the results of multivariate analysis suggested that audit
quality had only partially significant association with earnings management.
In Egypt, as a developing market example, Samaha and Hegazy (2010) showed a wide
variation in analytical procedures use by Big 4 audit firms and its counterparts. Moreover,
Khlif and Samaha (2016) evidenced that the association between audit committee activity
and internal control quality was more pronounced for Big 4-audited firms. For only
industrial Egyptian stock exchange (EGX) firms over 2005–2010, Reyad (2013) concluded a
general positive audit quality impact on reducing total accruals as a proxy for earnings
management. However, the implications of Big 4 vs local audit firms on earnings quality
(DA) have not explored in an Egyptian context yet.
Egypt is an emerging market case with diverse predictions about the accruals
superiority as an accounting-based performance measure. In the Egyptian capital market,
the financial analysis industry is still not long established, forecasted financial information
is not commonly disclosed by listed firms (Ragab and Omran, 2006; Ebaid, 2010). So, hard
copy/on-line financial statements could be the core information source for the potential
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Egyptian capital market investors. Accordingly, most Egyptian market stock transactions
are based on accrual accounting information. Therefore, the significance of accruals-based
measures for stock pricing appears to be very high in the Egyptian context (e.g. Ragab and
Omran, 2006; Hassan et al., 2009; Ebaid, 2010).
Previous research studies suggested that Egyptian-listed companies may engage in
manipulating earnings to keep previous year earnings performance, avoid reporting losses,
ease the external financing and achieve high-share valuation (Ebaid, 2012a). Recording
manipulative provisions, expenditures capitalizing not expensing and inventory
overestimation are the common techniques used in earnings manipulation (Kamel and
Elbana, 2010). Though, relative and incremental value relevance tends to be statistically
higher for the accrual-based performance measures than operating cash flows (Ebaid, 2012b).
In 2011, the EGX witnessed unique market crash (the Egyptian revolution crisis) with
adverse shocks that triggered a sudden loss of investor confidence in the EGX market.
In such crisis period, managers may be motivated to opportunistically manipulate earnings
using DA choices to cover poor firm performance. However, after many firms collapse
during the crisis, investors may have less confidence about these discretionary accounting
choices. Investors’ confidence loss in return would lead to a significant decline in the relative
DA value relevance.
In light of these institutional characteristics, exploring the role of external auditor as a
monitoring mechanism would be so crucial, more specifically; many economists have tried
to identify the role of auditors post-financial crisis due to reduce information asymmetry
(Persakis and Iatridis, 2016). The EGX-listed firms are trying to restore the public trust and
the provision of high quality financial reporting would be highly regarded. The economic
position was deteriorating and some firms would not have the enough resources to hire the
Big 4 firms. Non-Big “local” audit firms could compromise a suitable alternative if they
provide comparable audit services quality. Moreover, a listed Egyptian firm may ask for the
public sector audit services provision. The Accountability State Authority (ASA) is a public
governmental-based Egyptian audit firm. ASA is an independent entity that aims mainly to
achieve control over the state funds and funds of other public persons. Assuring the
credibility of financial reporting for the sake of public wealth protection can be provided by
ASA. A listed Egyptian firm is free to choose the type of the external audit, so being audited
by ASA is optional. No previous research in Egypt has focused on exploring the role of the
ASA vs other local private audit firms in mitigating earnings management to help the EGX
investors make more sound capital decisions.
Extending prior literature, this paper investigates the Big 4 vs local firms audit quality
implications in terms of DA and related market reactions. Furthermore, this paper
investigates the public vs private local firms audit quality implications. One recent study
of El Ghoul et al. (2016) evidenced the importance of auditor choice to the ex ante cost of
capital for public firms from 37 countries. They found corporate equity financing
worldwide was cheaper when Big 4 auditors monitored the financial reporting process,
although this relation was weaker outside the USA where the implicit insurance coverage
that auditors afforded investors was much lower. They argued that equity pricing role of
Big 4 auditors was stronger in countries with better institutions governing investor
protection and disclosure standards. This evidence is in line with Persakis and Iatridis’
(2016) findings, as they documented that higher (lower) audit quality implied higher
(lower) earnings quality in countries with high (low) investor protection. Moreover,
Persakis and Iatridis (2016) documented that audit quality and earnings quality were
lower during crisis periods. The findings of El Ghoul et al. (2016) along with Persakis and
Iatridis (2016) give motivation toward investigating the general potential effects of the
external auditor firm type on reporting quality and stock pricing in an emerging market
like Egypt, especially after the investor confidence shock of the Egyptian revolution

financial crisis, where the Egyptian institutional-based and accounting-based structures
would give incentives to be uncertain regards reliability of earnings components;
specifically accruals as a firm performance measure.
Over the sample period 2012–2015, the empirical results reveal that external audit firms
generally seem to play an ineffective role in reducing DA. Moreover, clients of Big 4 are
more likely to report higher DA level. In regards to EGX stock pricing, investors generally
do not consider either DA or external audit firm type as relevant stock valuation factors.
This paper makes several contributions. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this
paper is the first that examines the role of auditors on reporting quality and its related
pricing implications, in an Egyptian context. The paper extends prior developing market
context literature of audit quality and earnings quality in general. The paper provides
comparative analysis of the local public and private Egyptian audit firms’ quality which is
not considered before. The paper examines the auditor type quality implications over
2012–2015, i.e. meant to be mainly post the recent Egyptian revolution crisis period, which
has not been addressed before. Giving the sample period, the paper provides insights on the
managerial reporting behavior after crisis periods. Also, the paper findings highlight to
regulators the need for effective monitoring of audit firms’ performance to help reinforce
investor confidence in financial reporting quality.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides related theoretical
background and hypotheses development. Section 3 presents the research design. Section 4
shows the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
2. Background and hypotheses development
External auditor is regarded as one of the most effective monitoring mechanisms that help
lessen the interest conflicts between management and shareholders and also improve the
financial reporting credibility ( Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
The accrual-based accounting system provides managers with flexibility in communicating
private information about the firm’s future prospects (Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Healy and
Palepu, 1993); however, it can also be opportunistically used by management to maximize their
utility (e.g. to conceal economic losses). Accruals are the core of the accrual accounting system.
However, accruals recognition relies on valuations, allocations and deferrals, which all require
a higher degree of subjectivity (e.g. Dechow et al., 2010). Based upon, DA can be regarded as a
proxy for earnings management (e.g. Jones, 1991; Dechow and Dichev, 2002). Higher quality
audits are likely to be more effective in constraining the opportunistic reporting of DA, which,
in turn, shall result in higher relative and incremental accruals information content and more
appropriate DA pricing.
According to the agency theory, shareholders (principals) would bear monitoring costs to
mitigate the management (agent) opportunistic behavior. When the managers who initiate
and implement important decisions are not the major residual claimants and therefore do not
bear a major share of the wealth effects of their decisions, consequently they would have an
incentive to make decisions that expropriate shareholders’ wealth ( Jensen and Meckling, 1976;
Fama and Jensen, 1983). This agency conflict between managers and shareholders is derived
from the manager’s tendency to appropriate perquisites out of the company’s resources for his
own consumption ( Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The control of agency problems is important;
without effective control procedures, such decision managers are more likely to take actions
that deviate from the shareholders’ interests (wealth maximization). According to Jensen and
Meckling (1976), shareholders could limit divergences from their interest by establishing
appropriate incentives for the managers and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit
the management opportunistic activities. From an agency theory perspective, managers are
more likely to hire larger audit companies when the corporate firm has high agency costs and
potential gains of external monitoring are expected.
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In addition, signaling theory indicates that companies would like to distinguish
themselves to avoid the adverse selection problem as market investors would interpret the
inadequate earnings information as “bad news.” Accordingly, managers would prefer to hire
big audit companies to signal to the market their good performance and acceptance of
higher audit requirements.
DeAngelo’s (1981) theoretical framework indicates that auditors’ independence may be
compromised due to the relative client economic position. DeAngelo (1981) argued that audit
quality is not independent of audit firm size even if auditors would have identical
technological abilities. In regards, Big 4 auditors with greater number of clients have
“more to lose” if they fail to report a breach in a client’s financial statements. Small audit
firms are less likely to resist the threat because they have “less to lose” compared with large
audit firms (e.g. they bear less reputation loss and litigation risk), and therefore small audit
firms may provide lower audit quality (Khurana and Raman, 2004). In this setting, literature
generally suggests that large auditors are more effective in restraining managerial
opportunism in terms of accruals-based earnings management, and thus are able to lend
greater credibility to reported earnings (Khurana and Raman, 2004). However, Wilson (2015)
argued that local firms’ service-related independence improves financial reporting reliability
of important clients. Moreover, Kao et al. (2013) found that after SOX, non-Big 4 auditors did
not yield to client pressure to comprise reporting objectivity.
Egypt is an example of an emerging capital market that tries to support the current and
future investors in order to attract overseas investment and promote its capital. A critical
factor for achieving these objectives is the credibility and fairness of financial reporting.
Recently, the EGX witnessed a unique market crash (the Egyptian revolution crisis) with
adverse shocks. In such crisis period, managers may be motivated to opportunistically
manipulate earnings using DA choices to cover poor firm performance. As the managers’
motivations to opportunistically manage earnings for the sake of private gain (such as
executive compensation contracts) or to meet or beat earnings benchmarks are known
(Bartov et al., 2002; Graham et al., 2005), investors can be indeterminate as to whether or not
the stated earnings are the result of a rational and fair standards application. For example,
Makhaiel and Sherer (2017) showed that Egyptian corporate executives could be motivated
to manage the earnings number to meet the stakeholders’ expectations. Over 2005–2010,
Reyad (2013) showed that external auditor could limit the accruals component of earnings.
However, post the Egyptian revolution crisis, the external audit role in mitigating earnings
management has not investigated yet.
According to the Egyptian Corporate Governance code (ECGC, 2011), a company should
have an external auditor (elected by the general assembly) who is independent, with high
technical skills and does not have any business relationship with the corporation. The board
of directors should not control the decision to continue the external auditor assignment or to
decide his/her remuneration. The external audit should not be contracted for more than
consecutive five years. Further, the company’s board should not contract the external
auditor to carry out any additional tasks in conflict with the financial audit duties, except
with the audit committee approval. External auditor should submit a report on the
company’s compliance with the governance principles to the general authority for financial
control and the general assembly (ECGC, 2011). In light of these governance
recommendations, external auditor would be expected to help monitor the managerial
(agents) reporting behavior for the sake of the public stakeholders. Higher audit quality
would be more likely to provide higher earnings quality presented by lower DA level.
Previous developed markets research showed the non-significant quality differences
between Big 4 and local firms. Moreover, Rusmin et al.’s (2014) study of Malaysia, Indonesia
and Singapore emerging markets revealed that Big 4 vs local audit firms audit quality
had only partially significant association with earnings management. However, the

Egyptian context related research (Samaha and Hegazy, 2010; Khlif and Samaha, 2016)
asserted the relative higher audit quality provision of Big 4 than local audit firms before the
Egyptian revolution crisis.
Post the Egyptian revolution crisis, firms may choose to be audited by local firms to bear
less audit fees. Moreover, based on DeAngelo’s (1981) theoretical framework, managers
would assign private local firms to pressure the auditors to report misleading discretionary
earnings information giving the economic conditions. The ASA Egyptian public sector audit
firm is expected to provide relatively higher audit services quality. ASA is subject to the
government oversight and it operates for the sake of public wealth protection.
Based on theories and according to the Egyptian related literature, the following
hypotheses are formulated:
H1a. Clients of Big 4 audit firms report less DA than private local audit firms’ counterparts.
H1b. Clients of ASA audit firm report less DA than private local audit firms’ counterparts.
Although investors in an efficient market can rationally foresee earnings management, they
cannot see through it, i.e. they cannot disengage the earnings manipulations effects to reach
the fundamental (but unobservable) economic earnings number, and therefore price the
expected earnings opportunism (Bhattacharya et al., 2003). Given this pricing behavior,
managers may be expected to continue to manage earnings even when investors cannot be
systematically fooled (Stein, 1989).
Considering the accruals subjective estimation nature, prior research argued
that investors naively fixate on earnings level and neglect the distinction of accruals
future prospects (e.g. Xie, 2001; LaFond, 2005; Pincus et al., 2007). In future periods,
accruals have a tendency to reverse. However, investors may be wrongly optimistic
(pessimistic) in regards to the future prospects of high (low) accruals firms. Consequently,
firms with high (low) accruals earn low (high) abnormal returns because of investor
mispricing (e.g. Sloan, 1996). The inability of investors to distinguish the accounting
distortions embedded in accruals estimation causes their fixation on observed earnings
level and consequently improper assessment of stock returns. Literature (e.g. Sloan, 1996;
Xie, 2001) regarded the investors’ accruals fixation and mispricing to the managerial
earnings opportunism.
In an Egyptian context, Ebaid (2010) investigated the persistence of the accruals and
cash flow components of earnings and the implications of the associated reliability of
estimating different accruals categories. Ebaid’s (2010) findings revealed that the
persistence of earnings performance was attributed more to the cash flow component
than to accruals. Also, the findings revealed, consistent with Richardson et al. (2005),
that the persistence of accruals was affected by their reliability, where less reliable accruals
components have lower persistence than more reliable accruals components. However,
Ebaid’s (2010) analysis did not consider the investigation of the associated investors’ stock
pricing for each accruals reliability level.
Considering the external auditor effects on investors perception of accrual-earnings
quality, Wang et al. (2009) showed that Big 4 audit firms earned additional premiums;
however, the market provided no stock price premium advantage for the non-Big 4 firms.
Krishnan (2003) documented that equity investors assigned greater importance to DA
reported by firms audited by Big 4 relative to firms audited by local auditors. The higher
weight assigned to DA for valuation implied that investors find DA of Big 4 clients as
relatively more informative. To the best of author’s knowledge, no previous research has
investigated in an Egyptian context, the external auditor type and quality implications on
stock pricing.
In regards to the financial reporting quality after crisis periods, concerns can be raised
toward the management use of the accounting system to adjust earnings strategically
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(Persakis and Iatridis, 2016). Based on the literature findings, it can be argued that investors
cannot spread away the negative effects of earnings management and consequently to the
level that investors are aware of the link between earnings management and audit quality
and perceive Big 4 and local firms audit quality to be dissimilar, they may be anticipated to
react with price protection for the lower quality audit by requesting going forward expected
returns differentials.
Accordingly, post the Egyptian revolution crisis, the market investors are expected to
react more positively for the DA reported by Big 4 clients. Moreover, the market investors
are expected to react more negatively to the DA reported by private local audit firms’ clients.
Accordingly, the following hypotheses are formulated:
H2a. Investors pricing is more optimistic for Big 4 audit clients than private local audit
firms’ counterparts.
H2b. Investors pricing is more optimistic for ASA audit clients than private local audit
firms’ counterparts.
3. Research design
3.1 Audit firm type and DA
According to the agency theory, competent and independent external auditor is an effective
monitoring mechanism that can mitigate the level that executive managers would undertake
earnings management.
DA are estimated as the residuals from the cross-sectional modified Dechow and
Dichev’s (2002) model (McNichols, 2002). Some previous research papers have used the
modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model for assessing the quality of reported accruals
(e.g., Francis et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2008; Kim and Qi, 2010; Mashruwala and Mashruwala,
2011; Ogneva, 2012). Dechow and Dichev (2002) estimated DA through regressing
accruals on past, present, and future cash flows. In Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) model
discussion, McNichols (2002) proposed a combined model that added operating cash flows
to the modified Jones model (Dechow and Dichev’s 2002 modified model). McNichols (2002)
suggested that adding operating cash flow to the modified Jones model should improve
DA estimation (more explanatory power and less type I and type II errors). DA measure
for each firm in each year is the standard deviation of the residuals from the following
cross-sectional regression:
TACi;t ¼ b0 þb1 CFOi;t1 þb2 CFOi;t þb3 CFOi;t þ 1 þb4 DREVi;t þb5 PPEi;t þe;

(1)

where TACi,t is total current accruals for year t estimated using the balance sheet
approach, TACi,t ¼ ΔCAi,t − ΔCLi,t − ΔCashi,t +ΔSTDEBTi,t; ΔCAi,t is one-year change in
current assets; ΔCLi,t is one-year change in current liabilities; ΔCashi,t is one-year change
in cash; ΔSTDEBTi,t is one-year change in short term debt;CFOi,t: cash flow from
operations for year t is estimated as NIBEi,t − TAi,t, where NIBEi,t is net income before
extraordinary items; TAit is total accruals; ΔREVi,t is one-year change in revenues; and,
PPEi,t is property, plant and equipment for year t.
To investigate each audit firm type (Big 4, private and public) implications on DA level.
The following regression model is estimated:
DAi;t ¼ b0 þb1 AUDITi;t þb2 MARKTi;t þb3 ROAi;t þb4 LEVi;t þb5 CURRNTi;t
þyear fixed effect þindustry fixed effect þe;

(2)

where DAi,t is modified Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) model estimated discretionary accruals;
AUDITi,t is a dummy variable equal to one or zero otherwise; MARKTi,t is the market value

of equity at the beginning of the year t; ROAi,t is income before extraordinary items divided
by the beginning of year assets; LEVi,t is leverage ratio, calculated as total debt divided by
total assets; and CURRNTi,t is current assets divided by total assets.
In case the AUDIT coefficient is positive, it means that the relevant audit firm type
does not limit the opportunistic earnings management that can be regarded to either the
insufficient expertise or violated independence. Following Comprix and Huang (2015),
the market value of equity (MARKT) is considered to control for size and growth
opportunities. Further, the return on assets (ROA), debt ratio (LEV ) and current assets to
total assets ratio (CURRNT) are considered to control for the effect of firm’s performance.
3.2 Audit firm type and DA pricing reactions
The literature documented consistent and robust evidence advocating that investors might
not process the accrual-based earnings information efficiently in evaluating firms’
performance and assessing its future prospects (e.g. Collins and Hribar, 2000; Xie, 2001;
Thomas and Zhang, 2002; Chan et al., 2006). To investigate the external auditor firm type
potential effects on investors’ pricing of DA perceived quality, the following regression
model is formulated as follows:
Ri;t ¼ b0 þb1 DAi;t þ b2 AUDITi;t þb3 DAi;t x AUDITi;t
þb4 MARKTi;t þb5 M=Bi;t þb6 ROAi;t þ 1
þb7 LEVi;t þb8 CURRNTi;t þyear fixed effect þindustry fixed effect þe; (3)
where: Ri,t is stock annual return of a firm i in a year t, and M/Bi,t is the net assets market
value to book value ratio of a firm i in a year t.
The stock returns calculation starts three months after the financial year end, since this
is the period within which financial statements are required to be published in the EGX.
Following Doukakis and Papanastasopoulos (2014), stock returns are identified as the
growth in the value of a share-holding unit of equity at the closing price. The raw equity
return for a firm at month j is calculated as:
Ri;j ¼ Ri;j þ 1 =Ri;j1 :

(4)

With reference to Doukakis and Papanastasopoulos (2014), once firm monthly returns
are collected, one-year-ahead annual stock returns are calculated using compounded
12-monthly buy-and-hold returns.
3.3 Data and sample
The sample includes all listed EGX firms (except banks and financial services firms) for the
period of 2012–2015. The sample period is chosen to be post the EGX unique market crash
(Egyptian revolution) that triggered a sudden loss of investor confidence. Managerial
opportunism seems more probable in a revolutionary crisis period to cover the poor performance.
However, the investor confidence loss can lead to a significant decline in the DA value relevance.
An independent and qualified external auditor is expected to lessen the managerial earnings
manipulations and cut down the investors doubt in financial information reliability.
The type of each EGX sample firm’s external auditor for each year is identified through
hard/on-line financial statements. Sample EGX firms with dual external audit firms are
excluded. The empirical investigation tests use financial statement data extracted from
Thomson Reuters annual database. Sample EGX firms with missing financial and/or market
data (i.e. market capitalization value and stock returns) are excluded. By this, the sample would
reach an average of 188 EGX firms in each sample year to be classified into 52 firms using Big 4
audits, 110 firms using private local audits and 26 firms using ASA public audit services.
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4. Empirical results
4.1 Descriptive analysis
Table I presents the descriptive statistics for the listed EGX sample firms in total and for
each external auditor firm type group (Big 4, private and public). The mean log of total
assets (ASSET-log) is 8.90 for the full sample. Asset turnover (ATURN) is, on average,
0.8929 times per year and leverage (LEV ) has a mean value which indicates that 54 percent
of assets are financed through debt. Current assets represent, on average, 55.4 percent of
total assets (CURRNT). The average return on assets (ROA) is 3.78 percent and the mean
sales growth (SG) is almost 10 percent per year. The mean log of market capitalization
(MARKT-log) is 8.658, and market to book ratio (M/B) is on average 1.5 times per year.
The correlations between all variables are reported in Table II. The choice of private local
audit firms is negatively correlated with the log of total assets (ASSET-log) and log of net
assets market value (MARKT-log); inconsistently, a positive correlation is found for the Big 4
audits. Accordingly, it can be suggested that smaller size and less market exposed firms are
more likely to engage the local private audit firms. Also, the correlations statistics indicate that
firms with more earnings profitability (ROA) are more likely to choose Big 4 audit firms to
signal the reliability of its increased earnings. In contrast, the correlations coefficients show
that firms with higher DA are more probable to hire Big 4 audit firms. Consistent with the
agency conflict argument, the correlation analyses indicate that firms with high current asset
(CURRNT) and debts (LEV ) report more DA. However, a negative correlation is found
between DA and return on assets (ROA) and asset turnover (ATURN). This highlights the
reliability of sales recognition among the sample EGX listed firms. All significant correlations
are tested for multicolinearity issues through calculating the variable inflation factor (VIF).
A VIF score of more than 5 reflects a detrimental multicollinearity problem (Zikmund et al.,
2010). The VIF score for all variables are less than 5 while the VIF mean value is 1.0725;
accordingly, it seems that the empirical analyses do not suffer from multicolinearity issues.
Therefore, the regression analyses results can be interpreted with a high confidence level.
4.2 Audit firm type and DA implications
Table III presents the regression results (Equation 2) for the possible auditor firm
type implications on earnings management proxied by the DA level. The Big 4 audit type
All obs
mean SD
ASSET-log

Table I.
Auditor firm type:
descriptive analysis

Private obs
mean SD

Difference in
means (t statistics)

Big 4 obs
mean SD

Difference in
means (t statistics)

Public obs
mean SD

8.90
8.7156
8.60840***
9.1239
8.70841***
8.9690
0.676
0.65043
88.433
0.66881
102.341
0.53581
ROA
0.0378
0.0328
0.01409
0.0621
0.03288*
0.0278
0.09697
0.11855
0.775
0.07979
2.112
0.06494
MARKT-log 8.658
8.4837
8.39163***
8.8850
8.46937***
8.6843
0.664
0.62362
96.009
0.66173
105.106
0.65364
M/B
1.5359
1.0595
0.91273**
1.4092
1.04661***
3.0270
2.75579
1.66103
3.295
1.36190
4.807
5.13378
ATURN
0.8929
0.8562
0.98955***
0.6875
0.85186***
1.1817
0.94245
0.95158
6.129
0.46798
6.822
1.33084
LEV
0.5447
0.5597
0.55341***
0.5188
0.56661***
0.5696
0.25915
0.27016
12.110
0.23456
16.299
0.23391
CURRNT
0.5544
0.5617
0.51568***
0.5692
0.56508***
0.5865
0.22476
0.20907
16.705
0.21581
20.752
0.27541
SG
0.0992
0.1247
0.08386
0.1088
0.11729
0.1265
0.50702
0.56767
1.029
0.48477
1.582
0.50943
Note: *,**,***Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels (two-sided), respectively

ASSETlog

LEV

SG

ROA

M/B-log

DA

−0.153
0.106
BIG
0.242**
0.010
Public
−0.040
0.674
ASSET-log
0.215*
0.022
CURRNT
0.194*
0.039
LEV
0.317**
0.001
SG
−0.017
0.861
−0.189*
ROA
0.045
M/B-log
0.152
0.119
MARKT-log
0.189*
0.045
ATURN
−0.301**
0.001
DA
1
Notes: The statistics reported in this table are based on Pearson correlations, *,**Values displayed in italic
are significant at the 0.1 and 0.5 significance levels, respectively
Private

− 0.281**
0.002
0.293**
0.001
0.049
0.595
1

CURRNT

MARKTlog
ATURN

0.033
0.723
0.059
0.527
0.071
0.447
−0.152
0.100
1

0.059
0.527
−0.089
0.337
0.047
0.611
0.160
0.083
0.417**
0.000
1

Dependent variable: discretionary accruals
BIG 4
Firm
Coefficients
characteristics
Mean diff.
t statistics
0.44068***
9.601
Intercept
MARKT-log
ROA
LEV
CURRNT

0.471**
2.664
−3.251**
2.661
0.267*
1.923
−2.938**
−3.006
0.724*
1.841
0.809**
2.664
Included
Included

0.051 −0.052 −0.033
−0.268** −0.109
0.580 0.574
0.734
0.003
0.241
0.017 0.224* −0.017
0.305** −0.079
0.855 0.015
0.862
0.001
0.397
0.027 −0.051
0.068
0.019
0.129
0.774 0.585
0.481
0.834
0.165
0.041 0.193* −0.030
0.918** −0.253**
0.657 0.037
0.758
0.000
0.006
0.139 0.209* 0.289** −0.163
0.021
0.132 0.023
0.002
0.077
0.822
0.058 −0.210* 0.400** 0.054
−0.087
0.532 0.023
0.000
0.565
0.351
1
0.159
0.039
0.036
0.149
0.085
0.681
0.699
0.106
1
0.098
0.215*
0.310**
0.304
0.019
0.001
1
0.275** −0.027
0.003
0.781
1
−0.255**
0.005
1

Private
Coefficients
Mean diff.
t statistics
−0.213
−1.223
3.548**
−2.768
0.334*
2.367
−2.655**
−2.654
0.641
1.595
0.931*
2.014
Included
Included

0.50847***
11.002
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Table II.
Pearson’s correlations
for all variables

Public
Coefficients
Mean diff.
t statistics
−0.204
−0.970
−4.080**
−3.349
0.387**
2.832
−2.807**
2.792
0.597
1.485
1.004*
2.106
Included
Included

0.19492***
5.322

Year dummies
Industry
Table III.
dummies
Auditor firm type and
0.207
0.166
0.161
Adj R2
discretionary accruals
implications
Note: *,**,***Values displayed in italic are significant at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 significance levels, respectively
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coefficient is significantly positive (p-value by 5 percent). However, non-significant
negative coefficients are showed for both private local and public ASA audit types. So, firms
choosing Big 4 audits are more likely to report higher level of DA. In contrast, local private
and public ASA audits might lessen the reported DA.
The findings do not support the formulated H1a and H1b. H1a predicts lower DA for
Big 4-audited firms, while a significant positive Big 4 coefficient is evidenced for the DA
dependent variable. Moreover, H1b predicts lower DA for public ASA audited firms.
However, non-significant effects are explored for either local private or public audit firms for
the DA level. So, H1a and H1b are rejected.
Accordingly, the findings suggest the weak external audit firms monitoring role in
alleviating earnings management post the Egyptian revolution crisis (2012–2015).
These findings are in contradiction with the agency theory presumption that external
auditors would play an independent monitoring role mitigating the potential managerial
earnings opportunism such as reporting DA that can mislead the earnings information
users. Moreover, inconsistent with DeAngelo’s framework, the findings indicate that,
particularly, Big 4 firms’ engagement may fail to reduce the earnings management
behavior, although such Big 4 firms are exposed to reputational risk and market name
loss. In addition, investors may be misled by firms’ management that choose Big 4 audits
to signal the reliable reporting performance.
These finding are in contrast with prior Egyptian context literature indicating the higher
Big 4 audit quality provision (e.g. Samaha and Hegazy, 2010; Khlif and Samaha, 2016).
More particularly in regards to DA, the empirical findings are contrary to the evidenced
accruals mitigating effects of external audit by Reyad (2013) pre the Egyptian revolution
crisis. However, the findings are in line with Rusmin et al.’s (2014) findings indicating only
partial monitoring external auditor effects on DA.
Some prior literature studies (e.g. Fairfield et al., 2003; Richardson et al., 2006;
Linck et al., 2013) argued that DA could be used in a non-opportunistic way to signal the
potential value-increasing investment opportunities; in such case, auditors would help
firms make use of beneficial DA signaling the good news and accordingly the evidenced
audit type coefficients would be reasonably justified. For example, Linck et al. (2013)
hypothesized that firms with financial constraints would make credible use of DA to
signal any valuable positive projects prospects. The positive Big 4 coefficient for DA is
shown with negative (ROA) and positive (LEV ) coefficients; indicating that firms
with profitability difficulties and external financing needs are more likely to disclose
higher DA. This evidence is consistent with the preceding signaling DA tool argument
(Linck et al., 2013). However, such argument appropriateness needs further research.
Future research can consider partitioning the positive and negative DA separately
or using different DA estimation model like modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) or
performance-matched DA model (Kothari et al., 2005).
Regarding control variables, the findings reveal that higher market value (MARKT-log)
firms report more DA. This finding questions the investors’ ability to differentiate the DA
nature. Moreover, with more current assets firms tend to show higher DA. This finding
indicates that current assets value recognition is suspected. A negative DA relationship is
shown for profitability level (ROA), indicating that management of low earnings generating
firms have more incentives to mislead stakeholders disclosing more DA.
4.3 Audit firm type and DA pricing implications
Table IV (Equation 3) presents the following results. The coefficients of audit firm type
(AUDIT), DA and the interaction term between DA and audit firm type (DA×AUDIT) are
non-significant. These findings indicate that investors do not consider both of DA level and
audit firm type as important pricing factors. Such evidence could be regarded to the naïve

Firm characteristics

Big 4
Coefficients t statistics

Private
Coefficients t statistics

−0.782
−1.182
DA
0.029
0.441
AUDIT
−0.067
−0.746
DA × AUDIT
−0.052
−0.553
MARKT-log
0.059
0.800
M/B -log
−0.326*
−2.029
ROA
0.282
0.527
LEV
0.011
0.043
CURRNT
0.765**
3.247
Year dummies
Included
Industry dummies
Included
0.084
Adj R2
Note: *,**Values displayed in italic are significant at the 0.1
Intercept

Public
Coefficients t statistics

−0.550
−0.420
−0.812
−0.635
0.059
−0.022
0.912
−0.441
−0.008
0.126
−0.100
1.242
−0.129
0.193
−1.424
1.496
0.030
0.016
0.412
0.224
−0.276*
−0.329*
−1.778
−2.121
0.173
0.314
0.329
0.596
0.061
0.038
0.247
0.155
0.674**
0.637**
2.853
2.692
Included
Included
Included
Included
0.095
0.107
and 0.05 significance levels, respectively

investor’s explanation where investors are short of recognizing the DA nature or understanding
the external auditor’s monitoring role in mitigating the potential managerial opportunism.
On the other hand, these findings can be regarded to the investors’ lack of trust in the DA
information reliability, so they do not consider it in their assessment of the firms’
performance and valuation of stocks. This justification can be due to the EGX market
revolutionary crisis period.
The DA coefficient is positive for both of Big 4 and private local audits and negative for
ASA public audit. But the (AUDIT) and (DA × AUDIT) coefficients are negative for Big 4 and
private local audits and positive for ASA audit. The negative (AUDIT) and (DA × AUDIT)
coefficients of private audit firms are higher than Big 4’s related coefficients. These
non-significant coefficients directions indicate a partial audit type effect. The findings reflect
that DA would be perceived by investors as of higher reliability level if the firm’s earnings are
audited by the public ASA. However, DA are perceived by investors as of lower reliability
level for the private local audited firms. Accordingly, H2b, which states that investor’s DA
pricing would be more optimistic for ASA audit clients than local audit firms’ counterparts, is
supported. So, H2b can be partially accepted. Giving the higher negative non-significant
(AUDIT) and (DA × AUDIT) coefficients for private local firms than Big 4, it can be argued
that investors perceive DA of firms audited by Big 4 as more reliable relatively to firms
audited by local private counterparts. Accordingly, H2a can be partially supported.
The findings are consistent with the agency theory perspective that investors would
trust the more independent governmental-based audit services than private local
counterparts. Moreover, as per the signaling theory and DeAngelo’s framework, investors
can be more confident about the Big 4 firms rather than the local private ones due to their
market name and reputation along with their relative competence. Given the evidence of
greater DA reporting level for firms hiring Big 4 audits, this highlights the need for effective
enforcement and regulative promulgations that could monitor the auditors’ performance to
help raise investors’ trust regarding earnings information quality.
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Table IV.
Auditor firm type
and discretionary
accruals pricing
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In regards to the firm characteristics variables, only the market value of net assets
(MARKT-Log) and current assets ratio (CURRNT) are the priced factors by investors while
estimating stock prices.
5. Summary and conclusion
The paper investigates, in an Egyptian context, the external auditor type (Big 4 vs local)
implications on reporting quality (measured by DA) and related investors’ pricing reactions
over 2012–2015, that is meant to be post the Egyptian revolution crisis.
The findings reveal the minimal external auditor’s role in mitigating earnings
management. More specifically, EGX firms choosing Big 4 audits are significantly expected
to report more DA, whether the disclosure of such DA is for signaling potential value
increasing investments needs future research investigation.
Investigating the investors’ perspectives of audited DA, the empirical analysis indicates
that neither DA nor the external audit firm type are considered as important factors for EGX
firms’ stocks pricing.
The paper findings call for attention from the side of regulatory authorities in regards to
establishing effective mechanisms to enhance the effectiveness of the external auditor role
in regards to mitigating earnings management to help reinforce investor confidence in
financial reporting quality.
In emerging capital markets like Egypt, where the level of information asymmetry
appears to be greater than in developed markets, investors may be discouraged by
perceptions of unfair trading. It is essential to have effective enforcement, and regulatory
processes, as the external audit related mechanisms for monitoring the managerial behavior
in developing countries (i.e. imposing penalties on non-violators of the promulgated auditing
standards) is a key player in promoting higher confidence levels by investors.
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